Browsers and Certificate Validation

SUMMARY: Browsers are increasing in complexity every year. Even though most people use a browser every day, few know how browsers really work under the hood. This includes really important stuff, such as how browsers know an HTTPS server can be trusted. Read on for a step-by-step guide to browsers and certificate validation.

 

HTTPS (via SSL/TLS) uses public key encryption to protect browser communications from being read or modified in transit over the Internet. Servers provide visiting browsers with a public key that is used to establish an encrypted connection for all subsequent data exchanges.

However, just receiving a working public key alone does not guarantee that it (and by extension the server) is indeed owned by the correct remote subject (i.e. person, company or organization). Man-in-the-middle attackers can manipulate networks to serve their own keys, thereby compromising any communication.

Browsers prevent this by authenticating HTTPS servers using certificates, which are digital documents that bind a public key to an individual subject. The binding is asserted by having a trusted Certification Authority (CA) such as SSL.com verify the identity of prospective certificate owners, via automated and manual checks against qualified databases.

This trust relationship means that web user security is not absolute; rather, it requires users to trust browsers and CAs to protect their security. Therefore, we think it is in every user’s interests to have a basic understanding of how certificate validation works.

Note that the certificate validation process (described in detail in standard document RFC 5280) is quite convoluted. In this article we will try to walk you along one path (a browser validating a host’s SSL/TLS certificate) and navigate past complex details that are inconsequential to most users.

Certificates and the X.509 format

Certificates are digital files in every respect, which means that they need to follow a file format to store information (e.g. signatures, keys, issuers, etc.). While private PKI configurations can implement any format for their certificates, publicly-trusted PKIs (i.e. those trusted by the browsers) must conform to RFC 5280, which requires the use of the X.509 v3 format.

X.509 v3 allows certificates to include additional data, such as usage constraints or policy information, as extensions, with each extension being either critical or non-critical. Browsers can ignore invalid or unrecognised non-critical extensions, but they are required to process and validate all critical ones.

Certification Paths and Path Processing

CAs use a private key to cryptographically sign all issued certificates. Such signatures can irrevocably prove that a certificate was issued by a specific CA and that it was not modified after it was signed.

CAs establish ownership of their signing key by holding a self-issued certificate (called the root) for the corresponding public key. CAs have to observe tightly controlled and audited procedures to create, manage and utilize a root, and to minimize exposure will normally use a root to issue intermediate certificates. These intermediates can  then be used to issue their customers’ certificates.Browsers are shipped with a built-in list of trusted roots. (These are roots from CAs who have passed the browser’s stringent criteria for inclusion.) To verify a certificate, a browser will obtain a sequence of certificates, each one having signed the next certificate in the sequence, connecting the signing CA’s root to the server’s certificate.

This sequence of certificates is called a certification path. The path’s root is called a trust anchor and the server’s certificate is called the leaf or end entity certificate.

Path Construction

Oftentimes browsers have to consider multiple certification paths until they can find a valid one for a given certificate. Even though a path may contain certificates that “chain” together properly to a known anchor, the path itself may be rejected due to restrictions on path length, domain name, certificate usage, or policy.

Constructing and evaluating all possible paths is an expensive process performed for every new certificate a browser encounters. Browsers have implemented various optimizations to minimize the number of rejected candidate paths, but delving into such details is well beyond the scope of this article.

Path Validation

After a candidate certification path is constructed, browsers validate it using information contained in the certificates. A path is valid if browsers can cryptographically prove that, starting from a certificate directly signed by a trust anchor, each certificate’s corresponding private key was used to issue the next one in the path, all the way down to the leaf certificate.

Certification Path Validation Algorithm

RFC 5280 describes a standard algorithm that browsers follow to validate a certification path of X.509 certificates.

Basically, browsers iterate through all certificates in the path starting with the trust anchor (i.e. the root certificate), validating each certificate’s basic information and critical extensions.

If the procedure concludes with the last certificate in the path without errors, then the path is accepted as valid. If errors are produced, the path is marked as invalid.

Basic certificate processing

Regardless of any extensions, browsers must always verify basic certificate information such as the signature or the issuer. The following sections show the sequence of checks that browsers perform.

1. The browser verifies the certificate’s integrity

The signature on the certificate can be verified using normal public key cryptography. If the signature is invalid, then the certificate is considered to be modified after its issuance and is therefore rejected.

2. The browser verifies the certificate’s validity

A certificate’s validity period is the time interval during which the signing CA warrants that it will maintain information about its status. Browsers reject any certificates with a validity period ending before or starting after the date and time of the validation check.

3. The browser checks the certificate’s revocation status

When a certificate is issued, it is expected to be in use for its entire validity period. Of course, various circumstances may cause a certificate to become invalid before it naturally expires.

Such circumstances might include a subject changing their name or a suspected compromise of their private key. In cases like this, a CA needs to revoke the corresponding certificate, and users also place their trust in a CAs to notify browsers of their certificates’ revocation status.

RFC 5280 recommends that CAs use revocation lists for this purpose.

Certificate Revocation Lists (CRL)

CAs periodically issue a signed, time-stamped list of revoked certificates called a certificate revocation list (CRL). CRLs are distributed in publicly available repositories, and browsers can acquire and consult the CA’s latest CRL when validating a certificate.

One flaw of this method is that the time granularity of revocation is limited to the CRL issue period. A browser will be notified of a revocation only after all currently issued CRLs are scheduled to be updated. Depending on the signing CA’s policy, this might take an hour, day or even up to a week.

Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP)

There are other alternative methods to acquiring revocation status information, with the most popular being the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP).

Described in standard document RFC6960, OCSP lets a browser request a specific certificate’s revocation status from an online OCSP server (also called a reponder). When properly configured, OCSP is much more immediate and avoids the CRL update-latency issue mentioned above. In addition, OCSP Stapling improves performance and speed.

4. The browser verifies the issuer

Certificates are normally associated with two entities:

  1. The issuer, which is the entity owning the signing key and
  2. The subject, which refers to the owner of the public key that the certificate authenticates.

Browsers check that a certificate’s issuer field is the same as the subject field of the previous certificate in the path. For added security, most PKI implementations also verify that the issuer’s key is the same as the key that signed the current certificate. (Note that this is not true for the trust anchor, since roots are self-issued – i.e. they have the same issuer and subject.)

Constraints processing

The X.509 v3 format allows a CA to define constraints or restrictions on how each certificate is validated and used as critical extensions. Every certificate in the path can impose additional constraints that all subsequent certificates must obey.

Certificate constraints rarely affect the average Internet user, though they are quite common in enterprise SSL solutions. Functional constraints can serve several operational purposes, but their most significant use is to mitigate known security concerns.

5. The browser checks name constraints

A privately-owned (but publicly-trusted) intermediate CA with the appropriate name constraints can provide an organization with fine-grained control over certificate management and issuance. Certificates can be limited to a specific domain or domain tree (i.e. including subdomains) for a company or organization’s domain name. Name constraints are often used for intermediate CA certificates purchased from a publicly-trusted CA to prevent the intermediate CA from issuing perfectly valid certificates for third-party domains (e.g. google.com).

6. The browser checks policy constraints

A certificate policy is a legal document published by a CA, officially detailing the procedures they follow to issue and manage their certificates. CAs might issue a certificate under one or more policies, and links to these are included in each certificate issued so that relying parties can evaluate these policies before deciding to trust that certificate.

For legal and operational reasons, certificates can impose restrictions on which policies they can be subject to. If a certificate is found to contain critical policy constraints, browsers must validate them before proceeding. (However, critical policy constraints are rarely encountered in the real world and so will be disregarded for the rest of this article.)

7. The browser checks basic constraints (a.k.a. path length)

The X.509 v3 format allows issuers to define the maximum path length a certificate can support. This provides control over how far each certificate can be placed in a certification path. This is actually important – browsers used to disregard the certification path length until a researcher demonstrated, in a 2009 presentation, how he used his web site’s leaf certificate to forge a valid certificate for a large e-commerce web site.

8. The browser verifies key usage

The “key usage” extension states the purpose of the key contained in the certificate. Examples of such purposes include encipherment, signatures, certificate signing and so on. Browsers reject certificates violating their key usage constraints, such as encountering a server certificate with a key meant only for CRL signing.

9. The browser continues to process all remaining critical extensions

After processing the extensions mentioned above, browsers proceed to validate all remaining extensions that the current certificate designates as critical, before moving on to the next. If a browser reaches a path’s leaf certificate without error, then the path is accepted as valid. If any errors are produced the path is marked as invalid and a secure connection is not established.

Conclusion

The World Wide Web is a complex system of interconnected and constantly evolving moving parts. Browser security is thus not a solved problem, and we hope that this article has provided some insight into the complexity of even the one component we’ve looked at here. Trust plays a major role in keeping you safe online, and for that reason we urge you to inquire more about your CA’s certificate policy. (Feel free to review SSL.com’s policies here, in fact.)

Thanks for choosing SSL.com, where we believe a safer Internet is a better Internet.