Issue 8 | November 2026
This month: A hijacked GitHub account swapped OVHcloud’s official downloads for 90 minutes, and what a signature changes.
Plus: How attackers reached Binance’s wallet systems, and certificates issued for Google domains.
Attackers hijack country-code domains and obtain certificates for Google domains – Attackers breached the operators of three country-code domain registries (Ghana, Sierra Leone and American Samoa) and changed DNS records for Google and other domains. Because certificate authorities validate ownership through DNS, the attackers obtained unauthorized HTTPS certificates. Chrome blocked them and Google worked with the issuing CAs to revoke them, though Google says it can’t guarantee it found every affected domain. Do you know every certificate issued in your company’s name? Full story
Capcom: more than 11.7 million account records exposed – A third party got into CAPCOM ID, the shared login for Capcom’s web services and games, and exposed email addresses for more than 11.7 million accounts along with details like last login time. Passwords and card data weren’t exposed, though attackers changed the passwords on fewer than 200 accounts, and Capcom hasn’t said how they got in. One login shared across every product is one door for your whole customer base, so it’s worth asking how closely yours is watched. Full story
On Monday, Oct 19, an attacker used a compromised developer account on GitHub to replace the download files on five existing releases of OVHcloud’s command-line tool, going back several months. The replacements were the original tool rebuilt with extra code that steals secrets from any machine that ran it. The attacker also swapped the checksum list sitting next to the files, so the published hashes matched the malicious downloads.
The files were live for about 90 minutes, from 12:47 to 14:21 UTC, and were downloaded roughly 250 times. OVHcloud didn’t catch it. A customer’s build job, which pins the hash of the file it expects, started failing, and the customer reported it in a public issue. OVHcloud removed the swapped files about 30 minutes later and published a clean release that evening.
Why it matters to the business
The stealer went after the files developers keep on their machines: cloud credentials for AWS, Google Cloud and Azure, Terraform credentials and similar. Any team that installed or upgraded the tool during that window ran code built to take them. OVHcloud’s advice is to treat every secret on such a machine as compromised. Its advisory lists the hashes of the malicious files and a telltale folder the stealer leaves in the temp directory, so a team can check without running anything. Rotate keys from a different machine, since updating the tool doesn’t revoke keys that were already copied.
Nothing about the source code or the build pipeline was touched, according to OVHcloud’s postmortem. The weak point was the last step. Published releases could be changed by anyone holding the right account, because release immutability was switched off, and a hash stored beside the file proves nothing once the attacker can edit both.
The way in is worth noticing, because no part of the software company’s own build system was involved. The developer’s account was compromised months earlier, through a malicious extension installed on a personal computer, and the releases were swapped later with stolen keys rather than from that machine. OVHcloud lets developers join its GitHub organization with personal accounts, as many technology companies do, and says it’s now tightening how releases are published.
What could have helped
A digital signature is a check the attacker can’t rewrite. When the signing key sits in a cloud signing service such as SSL’s eSigner, rather than on a developer’s laptop or in a repository account, hijacking that account alone doesn’t give an attacker a valid signature, so replacing the files and the checksums isn’t enough. A swap like this one can then be caught by anyone whose installer verifies the signature. A signature only helps if the person or tool installing the file actually checks it. Release immutability, which OVHcloud has now turned on, closes the same gap from the other side: a published file can’t be replaced at all.
Three questions for your own releases
Each takes a few minutes to answer, and the answers show where your own releases could be swapped. Who can change a published file after it goes out, and from which devices? Where do the checksums live, and could the same account edit them? Does your installer check a signature, or does it trust whatever it downloaded? If it trusts whatever it downloaded, a signing key alone won’t protect your users.
Sources: OVHcloud security advisory, Oct 20, 2026; The Hacker News, Oct 20, 2026. Product facts: eSigner and code signing.
SSL is a Titanium sponsor of the PKI Consortium Post-Quantum Cryptography Conference in Amsterdam, December 1 to 3. The conference is hybrid, and registration is on the event page.
Contact us now to schedule upcoming meetings with our team.
This month: A hijacked GitHub account swapped OVHcloud’s official downloads for 90 minutes, and what a signature changes.
Plus: How attackers reached Binance’s wallet systems, and certificates issued for Google domains.
Recent News: The Latest from the Digital Trust Landscape
Binance explains how attackers reached its wallet systems – Binance says its record theft of more than $6 billion took months of patient work: a trojanized installer in June, a fake job interview in September that put malware on a second engineer’s work computer, and on Oct 29 a stolen deployment token that put malicious code on a third computer and ended in the service that signs wallet transactions. Ask your team how many of your most powerful systems can be reached from one employee’s laptop. Full storyAttackers hijack country-code domains and obtain certificates for Google domains – Attackers breached the operators of three country-code domain registries (Ghana, Sierra Leone and American Samoa) and changed DNS records for Google and other domains. Because certificate authorities validate ownership through DNS, the attackers obtained unauthorized HTTPS certificates. Chrome blocked them and Google worked with the issuing CAs to revoke them, though Google says it can’t guarantee it found every affected domain. Do you know every certificate issued in your company’s name? Full story
Capcom: more than 11.7 million account records exposed – A third party got into CAPCOM ID, the shared login for Capcom’s web services and games, and exposed email addresses for more than 11.7 million accounts along with details like last login time. Passwords and card data weren’t exposed, though attackers changed the passwords on fewer than 200 accounts, and Capcom hasn’t said how they got in. One login shared across every product is one door for your whole customer base, so it’s worth asking how closely yours is watched. Full story
Industry Spotlight: Practical Solutions for Real-World Challenges
The download that came from the vendor’s own pageOn Monday, Oct 19, an attacker used a compromised developer account on GitHub to replace the download files on five existing releases of OVHcloud’s command-line tool, going back several months. The replacements were the original tool rebuilt with extra code that steals secrets from any machine that ran it. The attacker also swapped the checksum list sitting next to the files, so the published hashes matched the malicious downloads.
The files were live for about 90 minutes, from 12:47 to 14:21 UTC, and were downloaded roughly 250 times. OVHcloud didn’t catch it. A customer’s build job, which pins the hash of the file it expects, started failing, and the customer reported it in a public issue. OVHcloud removed the swapped files about 30 minutes later and published a clean release that evening.
Why it matters to the business
The stealer went after the files developers keep on their machines: cloud credentials for AWS, Google Cloud and Azure, Terraform credentials and similar. Any team that installed or upgraded the tool during that window ran code built to take them. OVHcloud’s advice is to treat every secret on such a machine as compromised. Its advisory lists the hashes of the malicious files and a telltale folder the stealer leaves in the temp directory, so a team can check without running anything. Rotate keys from a different machine, since updating the tool doesn’t revoke keys that were already copied.
Nothing about the source code or the build pipeline was touched, according to OVHcloud’s postmortem. The weak point was the last step. Published releases could be changed by anyone holding the right account, because release immutability was switched off, and a hash stored beside the file proves nothing once the attacker can edit both.
The way in is worth noticing, because no part of the software company’s own build system was involved. The developer’s account was compromised months earlier, through a malicious extension installed on a personal computer, and the releases were swapped later with stolen keys rather than from that machine. OVHcloud lets developers join its GitHub organization with personal accounts, as many technology companies do, and says it’s now tightening how releases are published.
What could have helped
A digital signature is a check the attacker can’t rewrite. When the signing key sits in a cloud signing service such as SSL’s eSigner, rather than on a developer’s laptop or in a repository account, hijacking that account alone doesn’t give an attacker a valid signature, so replacing the files and the checksums isn’t enough. A swap like this one can then be caught by anyone whose installer verifies the signature. A signature only helps if the person or tool installing the file actually checks it. Release immutability, which OVHcloud has now turned on, closes the same gap from the other side: a published file can’t be replaced at all.
Three questions for your own releases
Each takes a few minutes to answer, and the answers show where your own releases could be swapped. Who can change a published file after it goes out, and from which devices? Where do the checksums live, and could the same account edit them? Does your installer check a signature, or does it trust whatever it downloaded? If it trusts whatever it downloaded, a signing key alone won’t protect your users.
Sources: OVHcloud security advisory, Oct 20, 2026; The Hacker News, Oct 20, 2026. Product facts: eSigner and code signing.
Past and Upcoming Events: Conferences, Standards Meetings, and more
Did you miss our recent webinar? Watch the recording of “Automating TLS with ACME” whenever suits you. It runs 39 minutes.SSL is a Titanium sponsor of the PKI Consortium Post-Quantum Cryptography Conference in Amsterdam, December 1 to 3. The conference is hybrid, and registration is on the event page.
Contact us now to schedule upcoming meetings with our team.
Quick Links: Guides, Articles, and Industry Resources
- Your SSL Account: Validations — A complete guide to the Validations page of your account portal.
- SSL Provenance API — Sign images and other assets with Content Credentials through the API, using an eSigner access token.
- Code Signing Certificates, Cloud Signing Options and Signing Operations Integration — What a code signing certificate proves, and how cloud signing fits into your signing operations.
- YubiKey FIPS tokens vs Thales/Gemalto USB tokens — A side-by-side comparison of two hardware token options for code signing and authentication.
- How to Add Digital Signatures to Microsoft 365 Files with eSigner — Sign Word, Excel and PowerPoint files with eSigner and a document signing certificate.
- What is a Digital Certificate? — A primer on what digital certificates are, how they’re used and where online security is heading.
Have questions about any of these topics or want to discuss your digital trust solutions with our experts? Reach out to us below: